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A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO
PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE
Alexander R. Pruss

Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds
w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never
chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these
worlds is a world that God can actualize.

1. Introduction
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) is an argument that possibly the
truth values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are such that
God cannot actualize a morally perfect world. A “morally perfect world”
is a world where at least one created agent has a libertarian-free choice
between something wrong and something not wrong (“is significantly
free”) and where no created agent does anything wrong. If God cannot
create a morally perfect world but can instead actualize a very good, but
morally imperfect, world containing created significantly free agents, he
will be justified in actualizing some such world. Therefore, if Plantinga’s
FWD succeeds, possibly God actualizes a world containing a moral evil,
and so the existence of God is logically compatible with the existence of
evil, which refutes the deductive argument from evil.
According to standard Molinism, which Plantinga’s FWD in the Nature of
Necessity1 does assume, CCFs have non-trivial, and at least typically contingent, truth values. I shall assume standard Molinism, and argue that there
is a pair of possible worlds, w1 and w2, each of which is morally perfect and
which are such that, necessarily, God can actualize w1 or God can actualize
w2 (or both). Consequently, the claim in Plantinga’s FWD that, possibly, God
1
Alvin Plantinga, Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford, 1974). In Alvin Plantinga, “SelfProfile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985),
49–52, Plantinga seems to attempt to give a version of the FWD that will be acceptable to
non-Molinists. However, as Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and The Existence of God (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 136ff. has argued, this attempt fails. For instance,
if all the relevant CCFs are necessarily false, then Plantinga’s account in “Self-Profile” implies that God cannot weakly actualize any world containing free agents. For, to do that,
God would have to cause something that counterfactually implies that the agents act as
they do, and that would require a true CCF.
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cannot actualize a morally perfect world is false, if standard Molinism is
true. Plantinga’s FWD is based on the possibility of transworld depravity.
Roughly speaking, transworld depravity says that every possible person
is such that were she created in any context that God could create her in,
either she would never have significant freedom or she would do wrong
at some time. The argument I shall give directly shows that transworld
depravity is impossible.
In the next section, I will give some crucial preliminaries, including
arguing for a controversial counterfactual Domination Principle inspired
by an example of Plantinga’s. In the subsequent section, I will construct
the pair w1 and w2 and argue on the basis of the Domination Principle that
God can actualize at least one of them, assuming standard Molinism. I
will then consider some objections. Finally, I will discuss some options
for free will defenses that are not affected by the objections. I am inclined
to think the problem lies not so much with free will defenses as such, but
with Molinism.
2. Crucial Preliminaries
2.1 CCFs
By stipulation, a CCF is a subjunctive conditional of the form C→F where C
is an “appropriate antecedent for F” and F reports that a created agent did or
did not freely choose something at a given time.2 Oddly enough, although
it is traditional to use the word “counterfactual” for C→F, no assumption
that C is false is made. It is somewhat difficult to characterize what an “appropriate antecedent for F” is. Plantinga’s characterization is that C is the
conjunction of all the states of affairs that God “strongly actualizes,” where
God strongly actualizes S provided that God causes S and every contingent
state of affairs that is “included in” (entailed?) by S.3 Another characterization is that C reports all the events in the temporal sequence of a world
right up to the choice that F describes, including the fact that a free choice
takes place, but not including any information on what the agent in fact did
choose, or anything that follows from that.4 In particular, the appropriate
antecedents will include all the considerations operative for the agent in
the choice and all the causal factors affecting the choice. I shall also assume
that only propositions that are possibly true are appropriate antecedents,
and whether an antecedent is appropriate to F is not a contingent matter.
Standard Molinism then says that CCFs have truth values independently of God’s activity, and God knows these truth values and can make use of
2
To reduce verbiage, I shall assume that if C → F is a CCF, so is C → ~F. This means that
a double, triple, etc. negation of a proposition reporting what someone did or did not freely
choose also counts as a proposition reporting what someone did or did not freely choose.
3
Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” 49.
4
Cf. for instance Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) and Richard Otte, “Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable
Worlds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009), 165–177.
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them in deciding which antecedents to actualize.5 But just to say this much
is not enough to be a standard Molinist. For instance, Robert M. Adams,6
a paradigmatic anti-Molinist, thinks that CCFs have truth value independently of God’s will, because, possibly with some exceptions (one of which
will actually be central to the argument for the Domination Principle),
they are simply false. I shall characterize standard Molinism by saying that
(a) God knows the truth values of CCFs, (b) God can act on these truth
values, and (c) the Conditional Law of Excluded Middle (CLEM) holds as
restricted to CCFs.
Unrestricted CLEM is the claim that, necessarily, p → q or p → ~q, for all
p and q (to be distinguished, of course, from the claim that p → (q or ~q),
which is trivial at least if p is possible). While one might argue for standard Molinism on the basis of CLEM, unrestricted CLEM is usually taken
to be implausible. Surely it is neither the case that were aliens to have inscribed a giant six digit integer on the far side of moon, then that integer
would be even, nor that if they were to do that, then the integer would be
odd. However, the standard Molinist accepts CLEM in the special case of
conditionals of the form C → F where F reports what a created person does
or does not freely choose and C is sufficiently determinate—and all the
“appropriate” antecedents will count as sufficiently determinate.
2.2 Dominance
Plantinga has offered the following interesting argument against those
who deny truth values to CCFs. Suppose that Mayor Curley Smith has accepted a bribe of $35,000 to drop his opposition to a bill. Plantinga writes:
Let us ask . . . whether he would have accepted a bribe of $36,000, everything else being as much as possible like the actual world. Here the answer
seems fairly clear: indeed he would have.7

Thus:
(1) Smith is offered $36,000 → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.
And so at least one conditional of free will (though perhaps not a CCF in
our present terminology as the antecedent may not be sufficiently determinate) is true. Interestingly, even Adams, though generally opposed to
Molinism, accepts this example, albeit holding that (1) is made true by the
facts of Smith’s actual choice.8
5
I will use the assumption that God knows these conditionals only in one place in the
argument. Even without the assumption, the conclusion follows that, necessarily, there is
a state of affairs that God could actualize that is such that were God to actualize it, there
would be a morally perfect world. However, the assumption is needed to yield the claim
that God knows how to identify that state of affairs—for what that state of affairs is will
depend on the actual truth values of CCFs.
6
Robert M. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 14 (1977), 109–117.
7
Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 177.
8
Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 115.
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Now, notice that we would not accept (1) in every case in which Smith
has accepted a $35K bribe—Plantinga rightly needs to assume that the
larger bribe is offered in circumstances as much as possible like the ones
with the smaller bribe. For instance, if state law has a higher penalty for
accepting a bribe over $35K, it might well be the case that although Smith
accepted $35K, he wouldn’t have risked accepting $36K. Likewise, it could
be that Smith has found a way of laundering $35K which wouldn’t work
for $36K, or Smith has a special liking for numbers that are divisible by
seven. Of course, when we are pulled to say that (1) is true, we are assuming none of these situations occur. Thus, what we are really committed to
is this:
(2) If any consideration in favor of taking the smaller bribe would apply
at least as well to the larger and any consideration there would be
against taking the larger bribe also in fact applied at least as well to
the smaller, and if Smith prefers more money to less money, then:
Smith is offered a larger bribe → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.
Now, (2) is a consequence of a Categorical Domination Principle, which
I submit we should accept as explaining (1) and (2). To introduce this principle, we need a notion of one set of circumstances dominating another
in respect of a choice. One way to define it is as follows. C* dominates C
for x choosing A if and only if: (a) C* counts as an alternative to C, so that
the choice it describes x as having before her is spatiotemporally located
just as in C, between the same options as in C, and both C and C* include
the same laws of nature (more conditions may need to be added here), (b)
every consideration included in C in favor of x choosing A is present in
C* with at least as great a force in favor of x choosing A, (c) every consideration in C* against x choosing A is present in C with at least as great a
force against x choosing A, and (d) either (i) some consideration is present
in C* in favor of choosing A that either isn’t present in C or does not favor
A in C or favors A less in C than it does in C* or (ii) some consideration is
present in C against choosing A that either isn’t present in C* or does not
count against A in C* or opposes A less in C* than it does in C. If we like,
we might add the condition that the agent has no inclination to act unreasonably for the sake of acting unreasonably.
I shall only use the notion of domination for “appropriate” antecedents
C and C*, and I shall take it that appropriate antecedents are sufficiently
determinate that whether C* does or does not dominate C is not a contingent matter. Our principle now is:
(CDP) Necessarily: If (a) C and C* are antecedents appropriate to <x
freely chooses A>, (b) C* dominates C for x choosing A, (c) C obtains, and (d) x freely chooses A, then C* → (x freely chooses A).
Here, <. . .> is shorthand for “the proposition that . . .”. I call this principle
“categorical,” because condition (d) talks of what x freely chooses, rather
than what x would freely choose.

404

Faith and Philosophy

The “considerations” mentioned in the definition of domination are
subjective in nature. What exactly they are depends on one’s theory of
action, but they are meant to be all the subjective factors that influence
the action. Candidates include one or more of: motives, desires, choicerelevant beliefs, subjective reasons, inclinations, etc.
The randomness objection to libertarian views of freedom holds that
insofar as our choices are not determined by the considerations, they are
random in a way that is incompatible with our responsibility. The most
promising approach to responding to the randomness objection appears
to be to hold that choices are always made because of considerations, even
when the choices are not determined by these considerations.9 Indeed, it is
difficult to see how something can be a choice when it does not come from
considerations. Moreover, there is a long-standing philosophical tradition
that we choose under the guise of the good, a tradition that is common
ground for many libertarians and compatibilists. But a part of what it is to
choose under the guise of the good is to be moved in one’s choice by the
apparent goodness of the options. And hence those who accept the guise
of the good thesis are apt to also agree that our choices are made because
of considerations. Granted, there is also a tradition, of which William
James is perhaps the most famous exponent, on which free choices are ultimately reasonless. I shall simply assume that this tradition is mistaken.
But if choices are made because of considerations, libertarians, whether
Molinist or not, should accept CDP. For, plausibly, a part of what one is
saying when one says that an action was chosen because of the considerations in favor of the action is that the strength of the considerations in favor of the action and the weakness of the considerations against the action
explain the action. But an explanation should have some robustness to it.
This robustness is plausibly provided by the idea that if the considerations
in favor of the action had been stronger and/or the considerations against
the action had been weaker, and otherwise the circumstances remained
relevantly the same, the agent would a fortiori have performed the action.
There is significant dialectical benefit to the libertarian’s accepting such
a principle, in that it gives a counterfactual robustness to reasons-based
explanations that helps answer the randomness objection.
Compare this case. A rope is rated for 800 pounds. If you attach a load
greater than 800, but less than 2000, pounds, it may or may not break—
the outcome is indeterministic, with the probability of breakage steadily
increasing with load. You hang 1000 pounds on the rope and it breaks. It
would be very odd to say: “If you had hung more, maybe it wouldn’t have
broken.” The intuition, surely, is that it would a fortiori have broken.
9
For libertarian accounts that proceed in this way, see, for instance, Randolph Clarke,
“Indeterminism and Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995), 125–138, or Robert
H. Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford, 1996). For a defense of a competing approach, not compatible with what I am defending here, see for instance Stewart C.
Goetz, “A Noncausal Theory of Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1988),
303–316.
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Or consider this line of thought. Just before watching the game on
television, Sally lays a wager of $100 on the Steelers to win. The Steelers
lose. Sally says: “Had I wagered on the other team, I would have won
the wager.” Now, the outcome of a football game depends on many free
choices, and on typical accounts of appropriate antecedents for CCFs,
Sally’s wager will be a part of the circumstances of these choices, even
though it is clearly causally irrelevant (of course one can rig the case so
it becomes relevant). The case supports the idea that changing a causally
irrelevant aspect of the circumstances should not affect the truth value
of a CCF. This idea is intuitively quite plausible. But if changing causally
irrelevant circumstances should not affect the CCF, then, a fortiori, changing the circumstances in a way that strictly promotes the consequent of
the CCF should not turn a true CCF into a false one. Admittedly, there are
Molinists who think you can have “bizarre” combinations of CCFs,10 but
it seems quite implausible that one could affect outcomes by doing things
that are causally irrelevant to the outcomes.
The above line of thought is compatible with the idea that if you knew
the considerations ahead of time, you would have predicted that the agent
would probably have acted differently. The agent may make an objectively unlikely choice, acting on the basis of what is objectively a minor consideration. But even when the agent acts in an unlikely way on the basis of
a minor consideration, her action is still explained by that consideration,
and the explanation can still have counterfactual robustness: if that minor
consideration were stronger, the agent would still have acted on it.
It’s worth noting that CDP is particularly plausible given the LewisStalnaker account of counterfactuals, since a world where one makes the
same decision on account of the same considerations appears closer than
a world where one not only makes a different decision but one acts against
the very considerations that had moved one in the actual world. Thus the
non-Molinist libertarian who accepts Lewis-Stalnaker semantics seems, in
fact, to be committed to CDP by this line of thought. The Molinist will not
be impressed by this argument, because either she rejects Lewis-Stalnaker
semantics or takes the truth values of counterfactuals to be prior to similarity relations, but the argument is sufficient to at least show that CDP is
compatible with libertarianism—that it does not, for instance, presuppose
that actions are determined by reasons.
And of course, it is possible that in the dominating circumstances C*,
x chooses otherwise than A, just as it is possible that in the original circumstances C, x chooses otherwise than A. CDP is compatible with these
claims. But given that x in fact chooses A in C, CDP claims that x would
have chosen A in C* as well as in C.
Now, consider the following modified principle which I will call simply the “Domination Principle”:

10

E.g., see Flint, Divine Providence, 208.
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(DP) Necessarily: If (a) C and C* are antecedents appropriate to <x freely chooses A>, (b) C* dominates C for x choosing A, and (c) C → (x
freely chooses A), then C* → (x freely chooses A).
The reasons for accepting CDP are, I think, reasons for accepting DP as
well. However, I can also give an explicit argument for DP from CDP under the simplifying assumption that it is within God’s power to make C
obtain and it is within God’s power to make C not obtain. It is very plausible that if DP holds with this simplifying assumption, it also holds without it, but in any case in the anti-FWD application we will need DP for,
this simplifying assumption will be satisfied. (The simplifying assumption may fail in cases where C itself involves prior creaturely free choices.)
Suppose that conditions (a)–(c) of DP are satisfied at a world w, and
assume CDP, and suppose that both C and its denial are within God’s
power. Let F be <x freely chooses A>. For a reductio, suppose that it is not
true at w that C* → F. For the sake of brevity, assume that w is the actual
world. So, we have (C → F) & ~(C* → F). Now, were C to hold, then (C → F)
& ~(C* → F) would still hold. For it is within God’s power to make C hold,
but according to standard Molinism it is not within God’s power to affect
the truth values of CCFs with appropriate antecedents, and if the truth
values of C → F or of C* → F would have been different had C held, then
God would have had the power to affect the truth values of CCFs, namely
by making or not making C hold. Therefore:
(3)	C → ((C → F) & ~(C* → F)).
Now, I will make use of three axioms about counterfactuals with possibly true antecedents (recall that all “appropriate” antecedents are possibly
true):
(4) If p → q, then p → (p&q).
(5) If p → q and necessarily (q if and only if r), then p → r.
(6) Necessarily: If p and p → q, then q.
It is a very easy exercise to see that from (3)–(6) we can derive:
(7) C → (C & F & (C → F) & ~(C* → F)).11
Now, neither domination nor appropriateness of antecedents are contingent matters. Therefore, conditions (a) and (b) in CDP hold necessarily
if they hold at w (which we assumed was the actual world), and so CDP
tells us that:
(8) Necessarily: If C & F, then C* → F.

By (3) and (4), we have C → (C & (C → F) & ~(C* → F)). By (6), we have necessarily: C
& (C → F) if and only if C & F & (C → F). Applying (5) and the fact that C → (C & (C → F) &
~(C* → F)), we obtain (7).
11
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Therefore:
(9) Necessarily: C & F if and only if C & F & (C* → F).
By (5), (7) and (9) we get:
(10) C → (C & F & (C* → F) & (C → F) & ~(C* → F)).
But the consequent of (10) is contradictory, and plausibly a counterfactual with possible antecedent and impossible consequent is always
false. Hence, we have an absurdity, and so the assumption that C* → F is
not true at w (which for convenience we took to be the actual world) must
be rejected. And, thus, DP is true.
3. The Construction
Consider a family W of worlds at each of which God creates Eve, an apple
and a dancing ground. At t1, Eve must freely choose between either eating the apple or dancing a jig. She cannot do both and she cannot fail to
choose one of these two options.12 These facts are going to be all a part of
all the relevant appropriate antecedents. Let A = <At t1 Eve chooses to eat
the apple>, and J = <At t1 Eve chooses to dance the jig>. Moreover, in the
worlds in W, this is the only free choice any creature ever gets, and the
laws of nature are deterministic except for that choice. In all the worlds in
W, Eve wants to eat the apple on account of its yumminess and to dance
the jig on account of merriness. In none of the worlds in W is Eve in any
way motivated by a desire to act contrary to the will of God as such or
inclined to act unreasonably, but Eve does have a motivation, though not
an overwhelming one, to obey God. There are no other relevant desires (in
some subsequent discussions, this condition will be relaxed).
Now, consider a world wJ in W. In wJ, God forbade Eve to eat the apple
(I stipulate that whenever I talk of prohibitions, the agent under the prohibition is aware of the prohibition), and Eve chose to dance the jig. Let
C be the antecedent appropriate to J in wJ. This will presumably include
God’s forbidding Eve from eating the apple, the apple’s looking yummy
to Eve, and Eve’s enjoying jigs, as well as other relevant facts. Moreover,
there is a world wA at which C also holds, but where, alas, Eve chooses to
eat the apple.
Next, let wJ* be a world just like wJ, except that in wJ*, God forbade Eve
to dance the jig instead of forbidding eating the apple, but Eve still chose
to dance the jig just as in wJ. Let C* be the antecedent appropriate to J in
wJ*. This will be very much like C, except that instead of including God’s
forbidding Eve from eating the apple, it includes God’s forbidding her
12
Thomas Flint notes that some libertarians will say that it is always possible simply to
refrain from acting. If so, then modify the example. Eve has a choice whether to eat the apple
or not. If she chooses not to eat the apple, a law of nature will determine her to dance a jig.
She is no longer choosing between eating the apple and dancing a jig, but between eating
the apple or acting in a way (viz., refraining from eating the apple) that necessitates her
dancing a jig. The rest of the argument can adapt to this.
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from dancing the jig. Finally, let wA* be a world just like wJ*, with the same
divine prohibition on dancing a jig, except that Eve eats the apple there.
I shall assume that Eve has a moral obligation—perhaps in virtue of
benefits received or her relationship with God—to obey God. Thus, in wJ
and wA, Eve is prohibited from eating the apple, whereas in wJ* and wA*,
Eve is instead prohibited from dancing the jig.
Observe that both wJ and wA* are morally perfect worlds: there is significant creaturely freedom, and nobody does wrong. I will now show
that if standard Molinism holds, then God can actualize wJ or God can
actualize wA*. All my premises will be necessary truths, and so the argument will establish (assuming standard Molinism) that, necessarily, God
can actualize a morally perfect world, which is all I need to show to refute
Plantinga’s FWD.
To see this, observe that if C → J, then God can actualize wJ by making C
hold. And if C* → A, then God can actualize wA* by making C* hold. Hence,
it suffices to show that C → J or C* → A. Moreover, if I can show this using only necessary truths as premises, then it will follow that transworld
depravity is necessarily false, since Eve would either be significantly free
and sinless were C to hold and were she to have no further opportunities
for significantly free action, or else she would be significantly free and
sinless were C* to hold and were she to have no further opportunities for
significantly free action.
I will now show that C → J or C* → A by showing that if ~(C → J), then
C* → A. To that end, suppose ~(C → J). Then, by CLEM as restricted to CCFs,
C → ~J is true. Moreover, because according to C, Eve must choose between
the jig and the apple, it follows that C → A is true. But C* dominates C in
respect of Eve choosing to eat the apple. For, all the considerations present
in C in favor of Eve’s eating the apple are also present in C* with equal
strength: the apple is just as yummy in C* as in C, and Eve has no motivation to disobey God as such, so the fact that in C* Eve is not forbidden to eat
the apple does not constitute a reason against eating the apple. Similarly,
all the considerations present in C* against eating the apple are also present in C with equal strength: the jig is just as merry in C as in C*, and Eve
has no desire to disobey God as such. On the other hand, there is a consideration in C against eating the apple that is not present in C*: according to
C, God has prohibited eating the apple, and Eve has a motivation to obey
God. Hence, indeed, we have domination. Since C → A, it follows by DP
that C* → A. Hence, we have shown that if ~(C → J), then C* → A.
Thus, we have shown that God can actualize wJ or God can actualize wA*.
Since both are morally perfect, it follows that God can actualize a morally
perfect world. Moreover, all the premises in the argument were necessary
truths. Hence, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world.
It is pretty intuitive that if Eve would eat the apple given C despite the
prohibition, she would a fortiori eat the apple given C*. Granted, sometimes, the fact that something is prohibited may motivate one—think of
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the use of “sinful” in advertising—but we have assumed that Eve does not
suffer from that perversity.13
4. Objections
Objection 1: The construction supposes that it is wrong for Eve to disobey
God. But, as Mark Murphy has argued at length,14 there is no duty for x
to obey God absent a special relationship between God and x, and without Eve having earlier been free, there is no way to ensure there is such a
special relationship.
Response: Rather than refuting Murphy’s argument, the simplest response is just to modify the case to evade the objection. Instead of letting
wA and wJ be worlds where God has forbidden eating the apple, let them be
worlds where Eve knows that eating the apple causes (through some odd
causal law) a severe harm to some non-consenting third party who does
not deserve the harm (e.g., an Adam who is not significantly free). Then
let wA* and wJ* be just like that, except this time it is the dancing of the jig
that is known to cause the harm. It’s wrong to eat an apple or dance a jig
simply on account of yumminess or merriment at the cost of severe harm
to a third party, and the rest of the argument goes through. Similar cases
can be multiplied.
Objection 2: Surely God has good reason to create a world with more
than one significantly free creature. But the example in this paper only
shows that God could create a world with one significantly free creature
that never goes wrong.
Response: The example generalizes. I will leave the details to the interested reader, but sketch the idea. Consider worlds with n persons,
E1, … , En. Each is facing a simultaneous and independent (maybe they are
doing this in far-separated parts of Eden) choice whether to eat an apple
or dance a jig, and each is either forbidden the apple or forbidden the jig.
Now, there are 2n possible combinations of relevant divine prohibitions:
maybe E1 is forbidden the apple, E2 the jig, and so on. We also assume
that the prohibitions are individually and independently communicated
to each person, so that what each person does is, plausibly (see also the
discussion of CRP, below), counterfactually independent of any combination of others’ actions and of divine commands to others. DP then ensures
that God can choose what to command Ei such that Ei would obey. If Ei
is such that she would eat the apple were she forbidden it, then by DP, Ei
would also eat the apple were she forbidden the jig instead, so God need
only forbid the jig to Ei. And if Ei is not such that she would eat the apple
were she forbidden it, and hence (by restricted CLEM) she is such that she
would not eat the apple were she forbidden the apple, then God can safely
forbid her to eat the apple. And, so, God can ensure that everybody makes
the right significantly free choice.
Cf. Otte, “Transworld Depravity and Unobtainable Worlds.”
Mark Murphy, An Essay on Divine Authority (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2002).

13
14
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Objection 3: Libertarians with whom I’ve discussed principles like CDP
and DP have tended to deny them. One intuitive reason for the denial appears to be the Counterfactual Repeat Intuition:
(CRI) If an agent freely chooses A in circumstances C, then it is possible
that if the memories of her choice and of its consequences were
deleted and she were put for a second time in circumstances just
like C, she would or at least might choose differently from how
she did the first time.
Response: I am happy to endorse CRI. But I do not know of a good argument from CRI to the denial of CDP. CDP does not talk of a repeat of C. It
talks of the agent having instead been in C*.
Consider again the case of Sally who has wagered $100 on the Steelers
and lost. I think we should affirm both of the following two claims:
(11) The Steelers would still have lost had Sally wagered on the other
team.
(12) It is possible that had the memories of all the participants in the
game been erased, and had they all been put in the same circumstances, the Steelers would or at least might have won.
We should affirm (11) because Sally’s wager was causally irrelevant.
But we should also affirm (12) because the players could make different
choices next time around. Thus it is quite possible to affirm instances of
the CRI, while holding that in other but very similar circumstances, the
agents would have acted the same way. Likewise it should be possible to
hold that in dominating circumstances, the agents would have acted in
the same way.
Objection 4: DP (and (1), CDP and CRP) involve a different kind of subjunctive conditional from that involved in DI and in Plantinga’s Molinist
CCFs. For instance, perhaps, the conditionals in DP are Lewis-Stalnaker
similarity-based conditionals or maybe Edgington-style conditional-probability conditionals,15 while the Molinist CCFs that God is guided by are
sui generis, and this difference in the kinds of conditionals explains the
clash in intuitions between those behind DI and those behind DP.
Response: I think this objection is plausible, but fatal to Molinism if correct. The reason it is fatal to Molinism is that it leaves the Molinist conditionals without a sufficiently robust connection to ordinary language.
For instance, (1) is a paradigm example of the sort of conditional of free
will that comes up in ordinary language. Indeed, I submit that in ordinary
language, when we talk about what people would have done, we either are
making probabilistic claims on the basis of similar circumstances they were
in (conditional-probability conditionals) or else we are making claims, informed by principles like CDP, about what people would have done, while
keeping fixed as much as possible of their actual decision-making (this
15
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might be rather like Lewis-Stalnaker conditionals). Plantinga’s (1) is one of
these last ones: we keep fixed as much as possible of Smith’s motivations
for his choice when we move to the counterfactual scenario. If Molinist
CCFs are completely different from these ordinary language subjunctive
conditional claims about free choices, then, I submit, we really have no idea
what the Molinist CCFs mean and why they would be relevant to divine
decisions. If this is right, then the Molinist cannot deny CDP (and hence
DP) without undercutting Molinism.
Objection 5: CDP is implausible in the case of patently unreasonable
choices. For instance, suppose Jim chooses a searing pain of magnitude
9 (on a 10 point scale) in place of a burning pain of magnitude 5, even
though he prefers a smaller pain to a greater and has no belief that pain
will make him stronger or the like. He just chooses that which he disprefers. Let C be the actual appropriate antecedent. Let C* be a modified
antecedent in a case where the searing pain has only magnitude 4, and the
burning pain still has magnitude 5. Given Jim’s weirdness, it is far from
clear that in C*, Jim would have chosen the searing pain, even though C*
dominates C in respect of choosing the searing pain.
Response: It is not clear whether Jim’s case is possible. In the case described, Jim does not act on account of any considerations. In this regard,
he differs from the masochist for whom the magnitude of pain may be a
consideration in favor of the pain. Thus, if we take acting on considerations
to be a necessary condition for making a choice, we need to dismiss Jim’s
case as impossible. And if we modify the case to that of the masochist, then
it becomes false that C* dominates C in respect of choosing the searing
pain. If, on the other hand, we attribute to Jim an inclination to act patently
unreasonably, then either the same response as in the case of the masochist
works or else, as I suggested earlier, in the definition of domination we need
only add the condition that the agent has no inclination to act unreasonably
for its own sake.
Objection 6: It is possible, pace everything that has been said about the
randomness objection to libertarianism, to make reasonless choices—
choices that do not come from any consideration.
Response: I can grant this and still run a variant of the argument. Simply
add an extra condition to the antecedents in the necessary conditional in
DP that x is unable to make a reasonless choice. Maybe x is psychologically
incapable of that, or maybe God makes it impossible for x. And then stipulate in the construction of my counterexample worlds that Eve is unable to
make a reasonless choice. Granted, if normally people can make reasonless
choices, this will restrict Eve’s freedom. But since she has two non-reasonless options available to her, and one of them is wrong and the other isn’t,
she is still significantly free. Our freedom typically is restricted in various
ways. A choice between punching someone who insulted me and ignoring
the insult can be significantly free even if I am psychologically incapable of
smiling gently in response to the insult. What is needed is that the choice
not be so restricted that there be no significant freedom left.
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The only real danger to the argument would be from a claim that not
only are reasonless choices sometimes possible, but that they are always
possible when an agent is facing a choice. This seems implausible. All
sorts of restrictions on our freedom are possible. It is possible, for instance, that one be psychologically incapable of choosing on the basis of
aesthetic reasons. Why couldn’t one, then, be psychologically incapable of
choosing reasonlessly?
Moreover, reasonless choices appear to be subject to the randomness
objection against libertarianism. But if they are subject to the randomness
objection, then reasonless choices are not something the agent is morally
responsible for and are not free choices.
Objection 7: God may want more than a world where everybody is significantly free and always does what is right: he may want a world where
some creature makes a significantly free choice out of duty. In my examples
of “morally perfect worlds,” Eve dances the jig or eats the apple because of
the jig’s merriness or the apple’s yumminess. Granted, she is obligated to
choose as she does, because the other choice is forbidden, but it does not
seem that she chooses because of the obligation. It may still be that, given
the contingent values of CCFs, God’s only way of getting a world where a
creature acts significantly freely out of duty is to actualize a world where
some (other or same) creature does wrong. (This suggestion was basically
made by Michael Bergmann in correspondence.)
Response: This objection amounts to a new Molinist FWD, not based
on the possibility of transworld depravity but on the possibility that the
CCFs preclude God from actualizing a world where both nobody does
wrong and yet some creature acts significantly freely out of duty. A fuller
evaluation of this FWD may well require a deeper analysis of the logic of
CCFs as well as of the nature of motivation. After all, the counterexample
to Plantinga’s FWD has shown that not all prima facie possible combinations of truth values of CCFs are in fact possible: DP places a significant
constraint on the combinatorics. There may be other such constraints, and
if one wishes to give a fully satisfactory Plantinga-style defense, the onus
of proof is now on one to show that the given combination of truth values
of CCFs that one posits the possibility of is in fact possible.
However, a further response can be made. We can imagine an agent
who has the property of motivational maximalism in respect of a decision:
necessarily, when she chooses an action A, she acts on all the undefeated
considerations that favor A (or disfavor non-A—I shall neglect this disjunct below). Her rationality is such that she is simply unable to ignore
any considerations that she neither is choosing against nor has a defeater
for. One might even think that all agents have motivational maximalism
in their choices, but there is no need for that controversial, and probably
false, assumption.
What I need here is that motivational maximalism is compatible with
significant freedom, and this appears quite plausible. Now, then, simply
add to my stories about Eve the assumption that she has motivational
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maximalism and that she has a consideration in favor of doing her duty.
Then, in these refined versions of wJ and wA*, Eve acts from all her considerations in favor of the jig and the apple, respectively, and duty is among
these considerations.
Now, maybe, this does not satisfy. For, maybe, God would want an
agent not only to choose significantly freely, but to choose it solely out of
duty. But it is not clear that this is all that desirable. It may well be the case
that, necessarily, whenever one has a duty to do something, there is some
other reason for the action which a virtuous agent will also be moved by.
It is one’s duty to visit a sick friend, and virtuous agents act on their duties. But the virtuous agent will visit her friend not just out of duty, but also
out of a desire to be with her friend. If this kind of a choice with mixed
motives is the best kind of choice, then there will be no special value in
choosing something solely out of duty, and so God will have no special
reason to prefer a world where somebody does that. And Eve’s motives
of yumminess and merriness may well in fact be motives that a virtuous person would have: a virtuous person appreciates perceptual goods
and rejoices in good circumstances—we may even, if we so wish, add a
theological significance to the yumminess and merriness (enjoying and
rejoicing in God’s creation, respectively).
Or maybe the case I gave where Eve has motivational maximalism is
unsatisfactory because the motivational maximalism is imposed on her
by God, rather than a result of her formation of her own character. But
further wielding of DP could, perhaps, ensure that Eve earlier achieved
motivational maximalism through free choices. For instance, maybe prior
to her apple/jig choice, she had a choice between a pear and a waltz, in
which choice she had a consideration in favor of gaining motivational
maximalism and none to the contrary, and the situation was set up so that
she knew which one of her potential choices would lead to her character
changing in a way that would make her have motivational maximalism.
By choosing whether the causal connection to motivational maximalism
is tied to the pear or to the waltz, God could ensure that Eve chose motivational maximalism and did so freely, at least if standard Molinism is
compatible with freedom. And then God inserts the apple/jig choice, as in
my original case.
The point of this response is not the rejection of all possible Molinist
defenses along the lines of the “out of duty” suggestion. The point is simply to highlight that finding an alternative along these lines is not easy
and requires significant additional effort going beyond Plantinga’s FWD.
Objection 8. Whenever one engages in a significantly free choice, one
always has available to one the possibility of engaging in the wrong choice
for the sake of rebelliously asserting one’s autonomy against God or the
moral law. But it was crucial to the domination condition in the story
about Eve that Eve had no reason to do wrong just because it was wrong.16
This objection is due to Thomas Flint.
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Response: While it is certainly possible to make such a demonic decision, it
does not seem psychologically plausible that every significantly free choice
has to include this possibility. A significantly free choice needs to include
one option that is wrong and one option that is not wrong—nothing more.
But while the theist can say in every wrongdoing one is at least implicitly
rebelling against God, it is not plausible that in every wrongdoing one is
acting as one does because the action is a rebellion against God. A person
could cheat on her taxes to get money to buy a yacht or commit adultery
to avoid loneliness or continue sinning out of a perversion of the desire to
experience God’s grace (cf. Romans 6:1). Thus the notion of a significantly
free choice does not require the possibility of such a demonic decision.
And just as a significantly free individual can be blind to aesthetic reasons,
she can also be blind to demonic reasons.
5. Closing Remarks
A FWD is an argument that possibly an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being could create a world containing evil. If DP is true, then
the most famous version of the FWD, Plantinga’s Molinist FWD, does not
work. However, non-Molinist FWDs continue to have a chance of working. It was essential to the argument that God be in a position to choose
between actualizing wJ and actualizing wA* on the basis of his knowledge
of CCFs, and that required Molinism. If, for instance, CCFs have no truth
values, or they are all false, or God only knows the truth values of a few
CCFs and his knowledge is explanatorily posterior to his decision of which
world to actualize, then the argument will fail to establish that God had
the power to knowingly actualize a morally perfect world. Indeed, Adams
has offered a defense based on such assumptions17 and Plantinga himself
thought that it is easier to offer a FWD in the absence of Molinism.18 Moreover, FWDs that are not based on God’s possible inability to actualize a
morally perfect world are unaffected.19
Plantinga’ thesis of the possibility of transworld depravity required an
appropriate independence thesis for CCFs, such as that when C and C* are
logically incompatible and appropriate, then C → F and C* → G are going to
be logically independent. DP questions such independence assumptions.
An interesting question would be to map out more of the logical structure of the space of CCFs. Is it, for instance, the case that all combinatorial
combinations of truth-values of CCFs consistent with DP and some logical
axioms about counterfactuals are possible? Or are there other substantive
axioms that need to be added? The question is interesting in itself, and
important to FWDs. It will, for instance, be relevant to a fuller evaluation
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of Molinist defenses like the one discussed in the seventh objection in the
preceding section.
The Molinist defender of Plantinga’s FWD should probably deny CDP
and DP. In justification of this denial, she may very well be forced to accept a
version of libertarianism on which free choices need not be explained, even
indeterministically, by any considerations. This would allow the Molinist
to hold that CCFs enjoy a logical independence from one another, so that,
for instance, if C and C* are logically incompatible and appropriate, then
C→F and C*→G are logically independent. It appears that Plantinga’s FWD
requires some such logical independence thesis in order to ensure the possibility of the scenario where all the CCFs come out in a way that precludes
God from actualizing a morally perfect world.20
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